A Glance into the Future: A Storytelling Approach to Strategic Utility of SOF

Authors:

Matthias Schwarzbauer, LTC, German Army

Joost Tuinman, MAJ, Royal Netherlands Army 15 February 2023

15 february 2023

In recent years a significant number of fictitious novels have been published dealing with future conflict, military strategy, and new technologies. One of the most popular examples is 2034: A Novel of the Next World War by former U.S. Marine Corps Special Operations officer Elliot Ackerman and retired U.S. Navy Admiral James Stavridis, dealing with a potential war in the Pacific region.1 However, storytelling as a way to reflect on future warfare is not new. It has been widely used in history, especially in times without real-life experience on great power conflict.2 The futurists August Cole and Peter Singer coined the term “useful fiction” to promote the value of well-researched and crafted stories for a more insightful discussion on the future. Useful fiction is at the intersection of entertainment and academic explorations.3 Other prominent examples are Cole and Singer’s novels Ghost Fleet and Burn-In, which explore especially future naval and cyber warfare.4 Storytelling is, no matter of the means, a powerful tool to ignite and shape thinking. And this applies just as much to civilian and military decision-makers. Sure, war dramas are not the primary source of information on military capabilities and strategy. Yet, stories still impact perceptions – and the thinking about the capabilities of Special Operations Forces (SOF) is no exception.

Nearly two decades of Counterterrorism (CT) and Counterinsurgency (COIN) missions invented the image of SOF as bearded, harsh door-kickers, often focusing on kinetic action. However, in the military and security policy realm, the discussion is ongoing on what role SOF play, or need to play, in a post-CT centric security environment. In the context of the changing paradigm from “Global War on Terror” to strategic competition with near peer rivals, Western SOF must consider refining their mission sets and unique offerings to political and military leaders. By definition, referring to NATO doctrine, “Special operations create strategic or operational level effects or are executed where significant political risk exists.” From this discussion, the question arises of whether, how, and why SOF has strategic utility in a strategic competition environment.

This working paper introduces a research design that seeks to combine the appeal of storytelling with the analytical question of the future role of SOF. The focus is of course not to write exciting stories; rather, we want to utilize the advantage of combining facts with fiction for a qualitative academic discussion. The central element is the study of strategic utility of SOF by examining case studies, which are based on fictitious yet realistic future scenarios. The focus of this paper is: How can a future-focused approach based on scenarios and fictional vignettes provide “lessons learned” on the strategic utility of SOF and consequently inform decision-making on a strategic level? The proposed method is part of the research project “The Strategic Utility of SOF in GPC: A NATO Perspective.”

This project focuses specifically on Russian and Chinese influence in the Euro-Atlantic area, and how SOF can counter these activities and support NATO’s strategic goals. Therefore, all presented tables and methods focus on a broader NATO background. Nevertheless, the application of the proposed research design can, and should, be modified in reference to the respective research object.

This paper is divided into four parts: the first section offers an overview of different theories of SOF, focusing on Tom Searle, an academic and former SOF practitioner, and his “Outside the Box” theory, and models of thought about the strategic utility of SOF, which later form the foundation for the scenario analysis.6 The second part introduces a three-step approach for the scenario development with the case selection, the thorough examination of the chosen security environment with the so-called escalation matrix, and the application of imagination to write vignettes. The third section presents two analytical tools to explore the strategic utility of SOF in the given scenarios: the “SOF tasks and activities” tool and the “out of the box” tool, based on Searle’s SOF theory. The last section summarizes central elements and hints at the use of the proposed research design in the examination of the strategic utility of SOF from a NATO perspective. The proposed storytelling methodology for developing and analyzing future realistic yet fictitious security contexts allows researchers and policymakers to think creatively about the strategic utility of SOF in the context of 21st century strategic competition and technological flux.

Overview: SOF doctrine and theories

Special operations (SO) and special operations forces (SOF) always had a special appeal to decision-makers and the public, either admired and celebrated or viewed with suspicion and jealousy. SOF is no new phenomenon. Most modern SOF units trace back their heritage to the Second World War, yet military formations for special tasks were well known back in ancient times.7 However, in recent years the public interest in SOF rose to new heights, and their new prominence created an astounding number of special forces war stories in public media. Still, besides the shiny public images, SOF proved highly effective in the tactical fight against terrorist organizations and insurgencies in real war zones in the last decades.

The baseline for the following research design is the description of relevant SOF doctrines and theories. They lay the groundwork for the analytical tools to explore the strategic utility of SOF in the future scenarios.

SOF doctrine: For our research project a comparative analysis of NATO, U.S., and Russian doctrine forms the baseline for defining SOF.8 In NATO, the Allied Joint Publication for Special Operations (AJP-3.5) is the foundational document for SO, SOF, and their employment within the Alliance. The AJP-3.5 states:

Special operations are military activities conducted by specially designated,

organized, trained, and equipped forces using distinct techniques and modes of

employment. These activities may be conducted across the full range of military

operations, independently or with conventional forces. … Special operations create

strategic or operational level effects or are executed where significant political risk

exists."9

The doctrine emphasizes that "NATO SOF are strategic assets to be employed to help achieve strategic and specified operational level objectives.” The NATO definition highlights the importance of the political context for SO, and their strategic and operational level effects.

The United States military formulates its fundamental understanding of SO in Joint Publication 3-05 Special Operations (JP 3-05):

Special operations require unique modes of employment, tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment. They are often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically and/or diplomatically sensitive environments, and are characterized by one or more of the following: time-sensitivity, clandestine or covert nature, low visibility, work with or through indigenous forces, greater requirements for regional orientation and cultural expertise, and a higher degree of risk. Special operations provide … discrete, precise, and scalable options that can be synchronized with activities of other interagency partners to achieve United States Government (USG) objectives.10

The U.S. definition highlights SO as unique, creating strategic government level effects, and stresses the sensitive environments they are conducted in.

For Russia, special operations have a long tradition with Spetsnaz and elite airborne units. However, in 2013, the Russian General Staff announced the creation of Russia’s own Special Operations Command as a unified SOF command and the establishment of according SOF units for the highest strategic tasks.11 The now-created Komandovanie Sil Spetsial’nalnykh Operatsii (KSSO), structured as Russia’s SOCOM, describes special operations:

The special operation of troops (forces) is a complex of special actions of troops (forces), coordinated by objectives and tasks, time and place of execution, conducted according to a single concept and plan in order to achieve certain goals. Special actions of troops are activities carried out by specially designated, organized, trained, and equipped forces, which apply methods and ways of fighting not typical for conventional forces (special reconnaissance, sabotage, counter-terrorist, counter-sabotage, counter intelligence, guerrilla, counter-guerrilla, assassination and other activities).

The NATO, U.S., and Russian SOF definitions have several common denominators: They all acknowledge that special operations are conducted by specially designated, selected, organized, and trained forces, have similar modes of employment (overt, covert, and clandestine), involve high political and military risk, and create ideally operational and strategic level effects. Nevertheless, there are significant differences in the exact tasks, missions, and activities these units should conduct for their nation or alliance. Table 1 summarizes these tasks and activities and highlights commonalities and differences. This template is the backbone for the later discussion of the utility of SOF in the scenarios with the “SOF tasks and activities” tool. It asks and determines if these defined SOF tasks and activities are applicable in the respective military situations described in the vignettes.

Table 1. SOF Tasks and Activities (derived from NATO, U.S., and Russian doctrine).

SOF theories: Alongside doctrine writers, scholars and practitioners have advanced variety of theories of SOF to explain principles, concepts, and characteristics of SO and SOF. The SOF community was and remains also engaged in discussions about whether a theory of SOF and special operations are necessary.13 The research project “The Strategic Utility of SOF in GPC: A NATO Perspective” describes and uses elements of a variety of theories; besides others, McRaven’s relative superiority theory in Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare, Spulak’s A Theory of Special Operations on mitigating friction by the employment of SOF, and Yarger’s 21st Century SOF: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations.14 However, the most relevant theorists for the proposed research design are Colin S. Gray with his seminal discussion on strategic utility of SO in Explorations in Strategy, and Tom Searle with his work on Outside the Box: A New General Theory of Special Operations.

Gray defines strategic utility as the contribution of a particular kind of military activity to the course and the outcome of an entire conflict concerning the consequences of the direct and indirect impact they facilitate.15 He explains that the strategic utility of SO is for most parts judgmental and limited quantifiable.16 Furthermore, he candidly argues that SOF are not the critical components, but it is the utility of special operations in all forms of conflict that defines SOF’s usefulness. It follows that some tasks are better suitable for SOF than others, and SOF is not the panacea for any critical situation in conflict and war. The prime concern of strategic utility is not to explain how special operations are conducted, but to explore the effect such operations can have on the course and outcome of a conflict.17

Gray’s description of the strategic utility of SO resides in nine claims, whereby two of the claims are more important than the others.18 These two master claims are 1) the ability to achieve significant results with limited forces – economy of force; and 2) the expansion of options available to political and strategic decision-makers – expansion of choice. The claims of economy of force and expansion of choice are the central arguments to qualitatively determine strategic utility of SOF. Nevertheless, none of Gray’s claims should be entirely neglected, and all can be part of the discussion on the strategic utility of SOF where applicable.

Searle’s Outside the Box explores the relationship between normal/conventional and special operations.19 His central argument is that special operations are “outside of the box” of operations conducted by conventional forces. Figure 1 visualizes this approach, whereby everything inside the bubble is defined as military operation. Searle’s concept follows two assumptions: 1) conventional operations are not everything the military instrument of power can do, and 2) conventional forces cannot cover the whole array of military operations. He sees SOF not as niche capabilities within the conventional box, but expansively. SO are everything outside the conventional box, to the outer limits of military responsibilities and authorities. SOF are also able to complement conventional forces and the value proposition they generate to have a strategic effect.

Figure 2. Special operations are military operations outside the conventional box.21

Searle’s Outside the Box-Theory is at the core of the “out of the box” tool to streamline the discussion on the strategic utility of SOF. Gray’s two master claims economy of force and expansion of choice are then the central factors to validate the strategic utility of SOF in the given scenario, around which the qualitative discussion should revolve.

Scenario Development – A Three-Step Approach

"The problem for defense planning that is beyond resolution is the scientifically certain fact

that we have no data from the future about the future." Colin S. Gray22

To discuss the strategic utility of SOF in a future context, the very first thing is to create a future scenario that is realistic, follows strict logic, and provides a useful background for the academic analysis. Initially, the notion of a scenario needs clarification. A scenario is defined as “an account or synopsis of a possible course of action or events.”23 Strategist Herman Kahn and Futurist Anthony J. Wiener say that “scenarios are attempts to describe in some detail a hypothetical sequence of events that could lead plausibly to the situation envisaged. … The scenario is particularly suited to dealing with events integrating several aspects of a situation more or less simultaneously. By the use of a relatively extensive scenario, the analyst may be able to get a feeling for events and the branching points dependent upon critical choices.”24 The political scientists Martin Neill, Wade P. Hinkle, and Gary Morgan add that a scenario’s plausibility “is essential to its credibility.”25 However, to better grasp a broad fictitious scenario, vignettes are very useful. These are short descriptive pieces of writing which are embedded in the scenario, focus on specific storylines or decision-points, and help make the complex environment more comprehensible and tangible. A broad scenario can include various of these short narratives. The choice of which storylines the researcher uses depends on the research question. The goal of this proposed scenario design is to write vignettes playing in a broad future security environment, focusing on considerations about the employment of SOF on a military strategic level.

Our scenario development follows three steps: 1) The case selection and decision on the overall background of the desired scenarios; 2) Deepening the understanding of the scenario environment by working through various scientifically grounded conflict variables and determining the “scenario skeleton;” and 3) the enhancement of the evidence-based variables with elements of imagination, enriching the scenario with “flesh and blood” to a well-crafted short story. The result is a tangible vignette that combines known facts with fiction. However, this fiction is no free fabrication but has to be grounded in the academic discussion on aspects of the future operational environment (FOE). Expectations of and assumptions on future political, social, and technological developments and changes greatly define the upcoming potential strategic problem sets. Timothy Heath and Matthew Lane’s work for the RAND cooperation on Science-Based Scenario Design: A Proposed Method to Support Political-Strategic Analysis was the starting point for several elements of the scenario development process.26

1. Case selection with the 3-Axes-Model:

The first step in the scenario development is the determination of when, where, and how a scenario unravels. One overarching scenario that covers all aspects of the complex strategic competition environment is difficult to accomplish and not valuable to discuss the strategic utility of SOF. The 3-Axes-Model helps to localize and determine useful cases and narrows down the conflict situation. Figure 2 depicts the model’s main elements.

The intensity of the first axis examines conflict, based on the 3C conflict continuum “competition – crisis – conflict.”

Even without the precise separation of these phases in reality, they resemble the idea of constants, trends, and shocks in types of conflict. Low intensity conflict in the competition phase is the “norm” in strategic competition and the constant denominator for NATO’s force structure and organization in the last decades. Low-intensity operations can have violent peaks in tactical operations yet do not involve large combat operations. Examples are NATO operations in the Balkans in the 1990s, continuous counterterror operations in Northern Africa and the Middle East, and recurring provocations at air and sea borders along NATO’s flanks.

Medium intensity conflict is closely connected with hybrid conflict. It includes violent and non-violent activities along the whole DIME (diplomatic, intelligence, military, economic) spectrum of instruments of national power and incorporates violent acts by proxies but are not openly conducted by one of the great powers.27

The trend to hybrid conflicts, involving a wide variety of state means in all domains, is one of the central observations of “evolution” in conflict.28 Despite violent elements, medium intensity conflicts remain under the threshold of armed conflict or, in NATO terms, below the Article 5 threshold.29 A prominent example is Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the following support for the violent separatist movements in Donetsk and Luhansk in Eastern Ukraine, beginning in 2014, until it spilled over into open war in February 2022.

High intensity conflict marks the top end of the intensity scale. This phase enters open combat operations in all domains by state actors yet also includes violent and non-violent activities by proxies and hostile influencing campaigns in the cyber domain. For example, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 crossed the threshold from hybrid conflict to armed conflict and war, which includes military combat operations by regular forces, separatists and insurgents, and private military contractors. High-intensity conflict is often accompanied by shocks in the security environment, which is defined as when decision-makers and societies “are overwhelmed by change.”30 The adaptability to shocks illustrates the resilience of affected actors and nations.

The second axis in the 3-Axes Model describes the direction of conflict.

It refers to the geographical areas and domains in which a conflict plays out. Figure 2 names NATO’s 360-degree approach. This concept refers to the Alliance’s ability to deter and defend against adversaries from all directions, “across the land, air, maritime, cyber and space domains, and against all threats and challenges.”31 The direction of conflict axis aims to facilitate a qualitative discussion and decision on the involved geographical regions and domains and does not follow an incremental process. A clear choice of what domains are covered and where a described conflict occurs streamlines the analysis.

The third axis is the conflict development over time.

Conflicts evolve and change, sometimes gradually but often within short timeframes. The development of conflict is linked to the 3C conflict continuum but does not necessarily follow exactly this sequence. Each scenario has a prologue that leads to the specific situations. Scenarios normally do not examine in detail the long-term development of the future security environment, which, of course, includes a large amount of uncertainty. Yet, the development over time should be considered in the scenario determination. The derived vignettes finally only describe specific conflict time stamps that are useful for the following analysis.

Figure 2. The 3-Axis Model for Scenario Case Selection (graph by authors).

2. The Escalation Matrix

The second step in the scenario design is the building of a template of relevant structural and proximate factors of the determined cases: the escalation matrix.32 The purpose of this template is 1) to gain an integrated deep understanding of the scenario’s security environment, 2) to explore various conflict variables from a holistic perspective, helping the researcher to realize each variable’s escalatory and de-escalatory influence on the security environment, and 3) to identify essential, interesting, or even controversial elements which later form the storyline of the vignettes or short stories.

Before deep-diving into the various conflict variables in detail, the central actors in the scenario must be pinpointed. To facilitate this discussion, Table 2 proposes a typology of antagonists. Heath and Lane categorize in their original template great powers, regional powers, minor powers, and non-state actors. 33 To better reflect the GPC discussion and the complexity of the Euro-Atlantic area, two additional categories have been added: 1) The separation from great powers to trans-regional powers, which have an available yet not unusual force capability;34 and 2) the role of International Governmental Organizations (IGO) as formal diplomatic forums but also as unified political and military actors. Based on the research question, this categorization can be changed, yet each type of actors needs a clear-cut definition to streamline and ease the discussion and choice of relevant antagonists in a scenario.

Table 2. Typology of Antagonists.35

After choosing the scenario’s central actors, the escalation matrix needs to be filled. Each box should be considered and discussed to deepen the understanding of the roots and reasons behind a crisis or conflict. Structural variables are broad systemic, economic, or societal level forces that shape the context for crises and conflict – the roots of conflict. These factors regularly develop and change over time and provide the, in many instances, subjectively rational incentive for decisionmakers to use force in crisis or conflict. On the other hand, proximate variables are immediate factors that affect individual decisionmakers or crisis situations – the cause of conflict or casus belli. They directly initiate decisions for the use of force in crisis or conflict. Each of these factors, structural and proximate, can have both escalatory and de-escalatory effects, dependent on the particular characteristics of the scenario’s security environment.

Tables 3 (structural variables) and 4 (proximate variables) show the exemplary escalation template for the GPC environment used in the research on the strategic utility of SOF in GPC. Next to each variable, the tables show different aspects of how they can either have a de-escalatory or an escalatory effect. Furthermore, explanatory examples of means and measures to identify these variables are listed.

Table 3. Escalation Matrix (Structural Variables).

Table 4. Escalation Matrix (Proximate Variables).

So far, steps one (case selection) and two (escalation matrix) of the scenario development process provide the factual background for the scenarios and vignettes. Analysts can now identify significant connections between actors and interdependent conflict variables, which form the “scenario skeleton.” In the next step, imagination, fiction, and storytelling add the “scenario flesh and blood” to link the “dots” to a more coherent picture and to overcome gaps in the storylines, as depicted in figure 3.

Figure 3. Scenario Plotlines (“Scenario Skeleton”).36

3. Imagination and Vignettes

The final step of the scenario building process is to enrich the scenario plotlines (“skeleton”) with fiction (“flesh and blood”) to provide tangible, easily understandable, and valuable vignettes that include a broad array of realistic factors for the analysis of the actual research goal. Gaps can be overcome by imagined yet realistic developments in the next years. Scenarios are not supposed to replace analytical thinking. Instead, they may be seen as a “bridge” between analytically oriented planning and creatively oriented strategy making due to their ability to transmit both rational and creative layers of thought.37 Details, also fictitious ones, make the vignettes more interesting and recognizable.

Figure 4. Scenario Plotlines Connected by Fiction (“Scenario Flesh and Blood”).38

Creating scenarios for the future always implies many assumptions and speculations. Rasmussen makes clear that “as an imagined future, the scenario story is pure fiction.” Kahn and Wieder add that scenario-builders have to be cautious because if the scenario is “divorced from reality as not only to be useless but also misleading,” and it becomes “dangerous.”39 However, packing the scenario in a remarkable story helps to connect the many factors of a possible security environment to serve the purpose of an academic discussion and not merely entertainment. Moreover, a well-crafted story highlights specific aspects the writer wants the reader to remember and comprehend.

Storytelling in the scenario development process serves two goals: (1) Vignettes allow a holistic view of the future. They are not supposed to replace analytical thinking but add new ideas, fiction, and even provocative thoughts to explore possible outcomes to stimulate planning and decision-making processes. (2) Adding storytelling to the fact-based future predictions makes it easier to retrace future relations between competition and conflict drivers. Rasmussen says that “early signals of the coming future can more easily be picked up.”40 In addition, narratives make the analysis more interesting and comprehensible for both the analyst and the reader.

A vignette can be told from many different angles and perspectives. The scenarios built to discuss the strategic utility of SOF combine details from specific geographic security environments, scientifically expected changes thereof in the next years, apply historical and doctrinal patterns in the behavior of central actors, and add expectations of the FOE in regards to technological, environmental, and political change. The proposed perspective is from a military strategic staff and avoids details of a first-person tactical viewpoint. Moreover, the research question demands to discuss the strategic utility of SOF, not solely the utility of SOF per se.

The research project “the strategic utility of SOF in GPC: a NATO perspective” will work with two scenarios, the Black Sea region with a trend/hybrid warfare context and the Arctic as a shock/high-intensity conflict. The Black Sea scenario will evolve around a complex situation with rising military built-ups in the internationally unrecognized states Transnistria and South Ossetia of local warlords, supported by Russian proxies and private military companies. In addition, Russia and China increase their political and (energy) economic pressure on Bulgaria, what creates significant tensions in Romania, Bulgaria, and Georgia (as a relevant non-NATO partner). The Arctic scenario plays in the High North and creates a conflict situation in Svalbard, which is Norwegian territory and has strategic significance for the Alliance. Both Russia and China employ proxies to coerce the local government. Nevertheless, both scenarios will stay below or short of the Alliance’s Article 5-threshold.

Analytical tools to discuss the strategic utility of SOF

“Future events may not be drawn from the restricted list of those we have learned are possible; we should expect to go on being surprised.”

Herman Kahn and Anthony Wiener41

This quote by Kahn and Wiener applies not only to future events but is especially relevant to the analysis of future scenarios. This working paper proposes two analytical tools to discuss the strategic utility of SOF in the designed future vignettes: 1) the “SOF tasks and activities” tool, examining the utility of SOF in the vignettes, and 2) the “out of the box” tool, providing a framework to discuss the two central claims for the strategic utility of SOF economy of force and expansion of choice. So far, following the overall methodology, the scenario design has only limited value as such. The analysis tools now help to determine, assess and discuss the research question’s core element: strategic utility.

1: “SOF Tasks and Activities” tool

This tool seeks to examine the “utility” part of the discussion on strategic utility of SOF. It helps to assess the applicability of the tasks and activities in the combined matrix of NATO, U.S., and Russian SOF doctrines in table 1. Now, the “SOF task and activities” tool examines the question: “Can defined SOF tasks, no matter from what country’s doctrine, be operationalized by SOF to support (NATO’s) strategic goals in the developed scenario?” Of course, this table can easily be modified with various tasks from other SOF theories, national and international doctrines, historical examples, and academic discussions.

The result is an on-point visualization of whether the respective task is applicable or not. The proposed template also requires short notes on how and why the respective conclusion (signal color) is drawn, based on the scenario content. Table 5 depicts an example of the tool’s application:

Table 5. “SOF Tasks and Activities” Tool (example).

The goal of the “SOF Tasks and Activities” tool is 1) to provide an accessible outline of the applicability and utility of specific SOF tasks in the scenarios. The reader can go over the scenario and vignette and has a concise overview of SOF tasking possibilities and voids thereof in the color-coded table; and 2) to decide on the utility (or usefulness) of SOF in the respective security environment and scenario. For the research on “The Strategic Utility of SOF in GPC: A NATO Perspective,” the template is not only based on Western SOF doctrines, also but includes Russian tasks, what generates more options to meet the in the scenarios described challenges.

Still, the reasonable tasking of SOF with a specific mission does not automatically result in creating strategic effects and influencing strategic level decision-making. The yardstick remains the support of strategic goals, which is the initial point of the second tool for analyzing the strategic utility of SOF, the “out of the box” tool.

2. “Out of the Box” tool

The “out of the box” tool refers to Searle’s SOF theory Outside the Box, that SOF conducts those military missions other units cannot perform. Searle’s central finding is that special operations are conducted “outside of the box” of conventional forces’ military operations. SOF fills voids in the strategic military profile but can also enhance or complement conventional operations.42 The tool follows a simple flowchart that guides a holistic discussion on SOF’s future role, including operations in new domains and in close cooperation with non-SOF capabilities, all under the premise of supporting strategic level goals. In the outlined flowchart in figure 4, NATO’s strategic goals are the starting point of the discussion.43

It is important to note that this analysis tool is not narrowed by existing doctrine and capabilities but asks provocative questions to explore more possibilities of how, where, and with what means SOF can create strategic effects. The “out of the box” tool tries to enhance a capacious glance and debate on future demands on SOF, including operations in new domains like space and cyber in close cooperation with other means and partners, through the given scenarios as the basis of future-oriented progressive thinking.

The starting point of the discussion is a thorough understanding of the strategic goals SOF should ideally support. The scenarios and the vignettes should be designed to contain a variety of singular strategic problems or an overall strategic problem. The “SOF task and activities” tool has already identified if and how SOF’s utility applies to these problems. Nevertheless, the pure utility in these specific situations does not necessarily mean that SOF is generally the better tool nor that its utility has strategic effects.43 NATO’s general strategic goals are to maintain peace in the Euro-Atlantic Area, to deter any aggression against NATO members and their territory, and to defend against any hostilities. Classified documents specify NATO’s military strategic goals.

Figure 4. “Out of the Box” Tool.

Following Searle’s approach of SOF operating outside the conventional “box,” and to start the exploration of the strategic utility of SOF, the first question is “Can conventional military capabilities solve the problem?”. If the answer is “yes,” that conventional forces are available and suitable to create the desired strategic effect following the strategic level goals, there are two more questions for SOF: “Can SOF enhance the conventional effort?” and “Can SOF accelerate the problem solving?” These two questions aim to discuss and prove the economy of force of SOF as one of the master claims for their strategic utility. The answer to these questions should address if and how SOF can support efficiency and effectiveness or, as Colin Gray names it, “act as a force multiplier and augment the strength of regular forces.”44 Nevertheless, the debate should also include the possibility that SOF, even if conventional forces are available, are the better option by creating disproportional effects in less time and by mitigating the risk of loss of life.

If the answer for the availability and suitability of conventional capabilities as problem solvers is “no,” the inevitable question occurs: “Can SOF solve the problem?” This question follows the claim of expansion of choice as central element of SOF’s strategic utility. If SOF can solve the problem and create strategic effects, still, possibilities have to be explored if and how conventional forces can enhance SOF’s chances for success: “Can conventional / emerging capabilities enhance SOF?” The discussion should not end with a doctrinal description of joint operations but might consider new and emerging technologies or tactics. If the answer, if SOF can solve the problem, is not a clearcut “yes” or “no,” but a “maybe” with some doubt about SOF’s suitability, the capability voids have to be analyzed, and more options have to be discussed if SOF operations can be expanded in other domains, require special technological capabilities, or additional legal or administrational support. However, if the answer, if SOF can solve the problem, is “no,” this does not automatically mean that the desired strategic effects cannot be created. NATO, like most other alliances, coalitions, and nation-states, has a full toolbox of diplomatic, economic, intelligence, or political means, next to its military capabilities. Nevertheless, SOF (and strategic decision-makers, of course) should keep an open eye on the ongoing crisis development to identify gaps in the non-military approaches and to fill the voids with their military capabilities where and when needed.

The combination of both tools, based on well-selected and designed scenarios, offers an extensive qualitative exploration of the strategic utility of SOF. This approach, which is in parts very rigorous (fact-based scenario design, “SOF tasks and activities” tool) and in other parts very flexible (fictitious vignettes, “out of the box” tool), can easily be adapted and applied to a variety of similar discussions, scenarios, and timelines.

Conclusion

“Fictional accounts had and continue to have more of an impact on policymakers than academia.”

Florence Gaub45

Futurists like Cole and Singer pack their stories in exciting novels, and in doing so ask provocative questions about the future, especially about naval or cyber warfare. Inspired by their ideas, we want to focus our effort on SOF. The goal of our proposed research design is of course not to write exciting stories. Rather, it is qualitative means to determine the strategic utility of SOF in the future strategic competition environment, built on a scenario-based approach. The background is an understanding of relevant SOF doctrines and theories on the employment of SOF. In the provided examples, NATO, U.S., and Russian doctrine set the stage for the discussion on the utility of SOF in future scenarios, leaving strategic effects at the sideline for a moment. Gray and Searle are the most beneficial sources for a modern understanding of the strategic utility of SOF. Gray’s master claims of economy of force and expansion of choice, always focusing on the strategic level effects of special operations, are the central discussion points to validate if SOF have strategic utility or not. Searle’s “outside the box” theory offers the ideal framework to ask if SOF are capable or better suited than conventional forces to create the desired strategic effects.

Nevertheless, to have a valid academic debate on the strategic utility of SOF in specific contexts, the scenarios have to be well-crafted. The foundation is a case selection that directly serves the research question. Furthermore, scenarios have to be as fact-based and realistic as possible. The proposed escalation matrix is an effective tool to expand knowledge and understanding of a security environment and potential, also fictitious, future crisis situations. Finally, imagination grounded in a discussion on the future operational environment helps to enrich and add detail to specific vignettes to make a story more tangible, interesting, and engaging for both the reader and the researcher. However, it is important to remember that the scenarios serve as a pure vehicle of a possible future crisis to bounce off the analysis of the strategic utility of SOF. The implementation of the two analysis tools, “SOF tasks and activities” and “out of the box,” provides a rich understanding of whether SOF has strategic utility in the future operational environment, or not.

The research project “The Strategic Utility of SOF in GPC: A NATO Perspective” seeks to apply this research design to provide insights into possible relevant security situations in the Black Sea and Arctic security regions for NATO. Furthermore, it aims to offer recommendations on how NATO’s SOF doctrine and understanding could, or should, evolve in the following years to meet the Alliance’s challenges in the next decade. Well-prepared SOF, now as in the previous decades, can play a vital role to meet NATO’s future strategic goals.

The authors:

Lieutenant Colonel Matthias Schwarzbauer is an infantry officer in the German Armed Forces. He holds an M.Sc. degree in economics and organizational sciences from the German Armed Forces University Munich and is a graduate of the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College (CDET). He is currently pursuing an M.Sc. degree in Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA.

Major Joost Tuinman is an Army Special Operations Officer in the Netherlands Armed Forces. He holds an M.A. degree from the U.S. Army Command & General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth and is currently graduating the Defense Analysis M.Sc. program at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the Naval Postgraduate School, U.S. Department of the Navy, U.S. Department of Defense, or that of any organization the authors are affiliated with.

Bibliography

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